It is recognized that the civilian population suffers the price of civil wars, as fighting factions target non-combatants through campaigns of rape, killing, and victimization. Given that their crimes are to be observed, what accounts for change among states or groups in their level of compliance with international human rights norms This paper is an analysis of theoretical framework of compliance with international humanitarian law and socialization process. This work seeks to establish causal mechanisms linking changes in the normative basis of international politics to the outcomes of state compliance with international humanitarian law highlighting the growing role of international law as a normative framework for armed conflicts. This research seeks to explain the problem of non-compliance with human rights law through the examination of compliance with the Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol II on the non-combatant immunity and tries to explain the persistence of one-sided violence (state) in the context of civil war. A study of compliance with law shows that constructivist explanations account for why states decide to comply, but rationalist considerations involving the costs of implementing decisions and variations in state capacity affect when and to what extent states comply. This paper attempts to review the theoretical basis of compliance with international law. I have proposed to adopt constructivist approach to reputation that is based on internalization of norms. The central argument states that socialisation should over time trump military necessity, as norms diffuse, and reputational pressures increase.
