Weakening the opposition through recall rules: The case of Zimbabwe

Most autocratic regimes today hold regular multi-party elections for parliamentary assemblies that provide formal checks on their rule. While violent repression and blatant fraud have been used for ages to quell opposition and disarm parliament as institution of contestation, autocrats are nowadays much inclined to deploy legal instruments to ensure their survival and govern smoothly. An understudied method to subvert the constraints posed by the opposition is to subdue its parliamentary forces through constitutional recall rules. Relying on such nominally legal provisions helps to preserve the belief that the rule of law prevails while obscuring the politicized nature of manipulation. Conceptually, we argue for extending recall typologies to include party-based rules and for capturing the variance in the “democraticness” of recall practices. Empirically, we provide an in-depth case study that sheds light on the scope conditions and mechanisms at work in an autocratic environment. Hence, we offer insights into how formally democratic recalls can be used as purely autocratic tool and how autocrats can prevent multi-party legislatures to challenge their rule through legal strategies.