Weakening the opposition through recall rules: The case of Zimbabwe in comparative perspective

Most autocratic regimes today hold regular multi-party elections for parliamentary assemblies that provide formal checks on their rule. While violent repression and blatant fraud have been used for ages to quell opposition and disarm parliament as institution of contestation, autocrats are nowadays much inclined to deploy legal instruments to ensure their survival and govern smoothly. One rather understudied method to subvert the constraints posed by the opposition is to subdue its parliamentary forces through constitutional recall rules. Relying on such nominally legal provisions helps to preserve the belief that the rule of law prevails while obscuring the politicized nature of manipulation. Focusing on the African continent, the paper takes two steps to advance our knowledge on that topic. First, we compare all constitutions to present a complete overview of existing recall regulations. The regional focus proves revealing since 46 supreme laws include relevant provisions and since numerous countries are leaning to the autocratic regime type. We also carve out the rules’ proneness to be used as tool of authoritarian control and look for empirical patterns. Second, we use Zimbabwe as an in-depth case study to shed light on the scope conditions and mechanisms at work. Overall, the paper provides insights into how autocrats can prevent formally empowered multi-party legislatures to challenge their rule through legal strategies.