The practice of political patronage in Romania has found its way from the ashes of the communist regime to the organizational core of the new political parties. Successive governing parties have gradually integrated and formed new networks of civil servants, political and economic elites. Applying the cartel party model theoretical frameworks, this paper explores the forms and functions of patronage networks. It asserts that patronage is a widespread practice within the administrative apparatus, being encouraged by deficient regulation and weak control of the state over the governing parties. It looks at the partisan recruitment process in both elective and non-elective functions and assesses the linkage forms within these networks. As opposed to the regulated party financing, politicised personnel networks within key public institutions provide a much less constrained means of financing party activity, making it one of the main functions of patronage networks in Romania. This paper accounts for differences in patronage tactics corresponding to changes in government, thus attributing certain patterns to different parties. The analysis is based on empirical evidence from Romania gathered though elite interviews, official documents and statistics, news reports and elite biographies.
