This paper examines and theorises NATO as an arrangement for the provision of a collective good – security. The paper sets out by describing the Alliance as a collective actor comprised of sovereign member states with a shared interest in the generation of solid military capabilities but also with individual interests in shifting as much of the common burden as possible onto their brothers in arms. As such, NATO is an organization made up of ‘friendly rivals’ (Thies, 2002). Managing the tension between individual and collective interest is a primary task for Alliance leaders. The paper''s second section, analyses the purpose of NATO in a ‘collective action theory’ perspective. The main argument in this section is that NATO has changed from a provider of club goods to a provider of both club goods and pure public goods. This has significant potential repercussions for the Alliance’s ability to go out of area and promote stability on a global scale. The paper''s third and final section assess NATO’s viability in the context of the Alliance’s reformulated raison d’être. I argue that NATO can in fact – contrary to the belief of many collection action theorists – produce pure public goods (e.g. conduct humanitarian interventions and peace stability operations) beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. As long as the Alliance continues to perform its traditional functions, NATO is likely to be able to deploy forces overseas.
