Can the two walk together? A cross-country analysis of institutional personalism in parliaments and electoral systems

While political parties have traditionally been viewed as the cornerstone of democratic governance, recent studies highlight a growing challenge to their dominance by individual politicians. This tension is particularly evident in parliaments, where the goals of the party group, which can be achieved by working as a unified team, can clash with the aspirations of individual members of parliament for personal prominence and exposure (Heidar and Koole, 2000; Wauters et al., 2021). Two dominant institutions define the power dynamics between the party group and the individual politicians: the electoral system and the parliament’s infrastructure, stipulated by laws, regulations, and customs. While the former determines how parties and politicians get elected to parliament, the latter dictates how they can operate in office. This study examines whether these two institutions align in the power balance they pose, favoring the party group (i.e., collegialism) or the individual politician (i.e., personalism). A cross-country analysis of 30 democracies was conducted to answer this question. The analysis reveals a correlation between personalism levels of the electoral systems and the power tradeoffs in parliamentary work, particularly in oversight tools and party group status, but not across all aspects. These findings suggest that analyzing parliaments and elections solely through the lens of political parties is insufficient and that it is imperative to consider individual politicians as key players in the legislative process. This study uncovers the dynamics between politicians and their party groups and the incentives they encounter in various aspects of their work.