Tombola Italiana: Asylum Decisions, Populist Principals, and the Politics of Bureaucratic Discretion

The integrity of international refugee law is undermined by significant variations and inconsistencies in asylum decisions, commonly referred to as 'refugee roulettes'. These disparities, driven by socio-economic and political factors as well as decision-makers' biases, challenge the principles of fairness central to Refugee Status Determination (RSD) processes. In Italy, a general downward trend in asylum protection rates conceals substantial sub-national discrepancies. This study investigates the influence of political and economic conditions on asylum outcomes within Italy's decentralized RSD system, focusing on the role of the radical right Minister of Interior, Matteo Salvini (2018–2019). Drawing on the Principal-Agent Framework and theories of bureaucratic motivation, the analysis combines panel regressions and a Difference-in-Differences design leveraging the staggered appointment of prefects by Salvini. The findings show that, contrary to expectations, appointments made by the Minister had no discernible effect on asylum outcomes. Instead, local-level political configurations and economic conditions were more consistent predictors of approval rates—particularly for specific forms of protection. These results complicate assumptions about the direct transmission of populist influence through state bureaucracies and highlight the fragmented nature of political control over administrative discretion. They also underscore the resilience of institutional constraints in mediating political pressure, even under a centralizing populist agenda.