The notion of “soft power” is omnipresent in much of the rhetoric on the EU’s external action. At the same time, this concept is remarkably vague and ill-defined. Soft power is generally described as power without constraints, “co-opting” people rather than coercing them. The absence of sanctions – be they positive or negative, carrots or sticks – is what is said to make this type of power “soft”. In other words, its underlying base values are seduction and attractiveness. Consequently, if one were to turn around the argument, what characterizes soft power is that the “emitter” of soft power has hardly any influence over its working, given that attractiveness most logically is in the eye of the beholder.
In order to play the role of an international security actor, the EU must be able to make strategic use of its power resources. Yet, to what extent is it conceivable to strategically project soft power, i.e. apply specific measures in order to reach a defined objective? Is it at all possible to steer the effects of soft power? Especially when dealing with hostile actors which are arguably the key issue in providing security? Or is Europe simply betting on the wrong horse?
This paper seeks to answer a seemingly mundane question: is soft power really power? Is it theoretically conceivable to base strategic action on soft power, and if so, under what circumstances? In other words, is soft power compatible with ambitions of being a “security provider”? It will first of all set out to refine the definition of soft power by attempting to connect the notion to traditional strands of the “power” literature, notably (classical) realist approaches and Max Weber. From there, it will discuss the strategic value of “soft power” and its usability in objective-based foreign policy action.
