ECPR

Install the app

Install this application on your home screen for quick and easy access when you’re on the go.

Just tap Share then “Add to Home Screen”

ECPR

Install the app

Install this application on your home screen for quick and easy access when you’re on the go.

Just tap Share then “Add to Home Screen”

The Carrot or the Stick? Reflecting on Member States’ Behaviour When Self-interest Differs From EU Norms

Europe (Central and Eastern)
Democracy
European Politics
European Union
Institutions
Europeanisation through Law
Euroscepticism
Mixed Methods
Giada D'Andrea
University of Surrey
Giada D'Andrea
University of Surrey

Abstract

In response to democratic backsliding, the EU has repeatedly implemented its safeguard mechanisms against Poland and Hungary, aiming to protect its democratic processes from disruption and non-compliance and to redirect these backsliding member states toward liberal democracy. However, the erosion of democracy in both countries continues and is even spreading to other EU member states. This raises the question: ”Under which circumstances, and for what reasons, are EU safeguard mechanisms effective against democratic backsliding?” Drawing on a novel institutionalist approach, I argue that member states attempt to pursue their interests while observing EU norms, engaging in a strategic three-level game to balance national and European stakeholders’ concerns. However, the interests of backsliding states directly oppose the EU norms and values, leading to discontent either at the domestic or EU level. Similarly, the EU is a rational actor, and member states’ compliance with EU norms is among its core interests. Consequently, the EU conducts a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether to implement its safeguard mechanisms and, if so, whether to opt for soft or strong ones. Acting in this multi-level game, the EU weighs its measures' potential effectiveness, associated costs, and the reactions of other member states. In response to EU safeguard mechanisms, backsliding member states make strategic decisions about their behaviour. Applying their cost-benefit analysis within the three-level game, they may choose to realign with EU norms and rules, or to continue deviating from them, deflecting blame onto other actors while continuing to maximise their own benefits. By examining the period from their accession to the present, I identify the observation eras in which the EU employed different types of safeguard mechanisms against Poland and Hungary. I then analyse the member states’ responses, highlighting when and why the EU safeguard mechanisms have been effective in curbing democratic backsliding.