This paper examines US democracy promotion in the cases of Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq and accepts that the product of these democratisations is not consolidated democracy but formal, illiberal and restricted. During this period, the idealism of US values and the realism of US national interests successfully combined, rhetorically at least, in democracy promotion. In fact, national interests, as determined by the Clinton and Bush administrations, incorporated these values of democracy into the national interest framework, albeit a low-grade one. The evidence confirms that the idealist values of promoting democracy can conflict with the realist pursuit of narrowly defined national interests in this era of convergence. The event that separates these two elements from their previous ‘harmonious’ relationship is when the fulfilment of US values to aid democratic consolidation requires more than the limited institutional and civil society support that USAID’s assistance offers. This event is sparked by this transition-flawed assistance and the failures of the ‘short’ time given by the US (in part due to its domestic desire for quick results) to successfully consolidate democracy (or at least to be on its path). The narrowly defined national economic and security interests are fulfilled by the process of democratisation and not the end-product and therefore the drive to achieve consolidation is not required by the US.
