What We Owe to Each Other When Democracy Fractures?

Moral philosopher T. M. Scanlon argues in his groundbreaking book What We Owe to Each Other that the moral worth of a principle or action depends on whether it can be justified to others in terms that they could not reasonably reject. This moral standard proposes that principles governing our actions must be acceptable to all affected individuals based on justifiability. Scanlon's proposal ensures that moral decisions respect the perspectives and concerns of everyone involved, hence promoting fairness, reciprocity, and mutual recognition in shared social practices. Although not exclusively emphasized by Scanlon, this concept of reasonable rejection becomes particularly challenging in polarized societies. The more divided the society, the less individuals will be eager to justify their moral and political actions based on the others, especially because of the lack of common ground and rising partisan biases. In such a context, two fundamental problems arise. First, it would be more challenging to set the reasonable rejection as an inclusive moral standard because of the lack of interconnection. Affective polarisation essentially induces further polarized social practices, and this would eventually prevent the meaningful moral dialogue necessary to establish shared principles, hence deepening divisions and undermining the ethical foundations of democracy. The second problem arises when the affective polarization disrupts the sense of collective obligation necessary for citizens to sustain democratic systems, as individuals increasingly disengage from broader democratic commitments in favor of partisan interests. This problem introduces further worries about the fractured social practices' effect on democratic commitment and resilience. This project aims to incorporate Scanlon's contractualism into this twofold puzzle in order to solve it from a perspective that emphasizes the ethical foundations of democratic exchange in polarized societies. It will argue that citizens' moral obligations towards each other can be reoriented to prioritize moral principles that remain justifiable across partisan divides, promoting an inclusive moral foundation for sustaining democratic systems. Acknowledging the social and political challenges in polarized societies, this project will underline the importance of securing and grounding moral principles that necessarily rely on others, hence aiming to present an optimistic picture of how to morally overcome affective polarisation by examining moral philosophy. Following this theoretical framework, it will conclude that Scanlon's contractualism has much to offer in such a context by underlying interdependence and moral dialogue as principles that can sustain democratic obligations and commitments in fractured societies.