Same or Different? Ethics of Voting for Democratic and Undemocratic Elections

Is there a need to develop an ethics of voting specifically for undemocratic electoral regimes? While contemporary analytical ethics of voting either explicitly or implicitly address voters in democratic elections, elections take place in several undemocratic regimes too (Schedler 2013; V-DEM 2024). Thus, we should ask whether and to what extent the assumptions or findings of an ethics of voting for democratic elections is relevant to an ethics of voting for undemocratic elections. In this paper, I outline three different methodological approaches to these questions and argue for the superiority of a moderately specific approach to the ethics of voting in undemocratic elections. A unitary, general approach holds that the same ethics of voting applies to both democratic and undemocratic elections. On such an approach, the fine-grained action-guiding implications of an ethics of voting still vary between different factual circumstances—both across democracies (e.g., depending on electoral systems) and between democratic and undemocratic electoral regimes. But this is just to say the same fundamental moral principles are applied to different factual circumstances. Absent explicit reflection on undemocratic elections, it is fair to say that this is the most widespread—though implicit—approach in the current literature. For example, on Julia Maskivker’s (2019) account, we should vote based on considerations of justice—whether or not in a democratic election. This approach offers action-guidance for election in both non-ideal democracies—the ones the most fortunate of us live in—and undemocratic regimes. A regime-specific approach holds that democratic and undemocratic regimes should give rise to different ethics of voting. First, a democratic ethics of voting may rely on moral norms that are only relevantly applicable to democratic contexts. For instance, a duty to do one’s share in ensuring that democracy functions excellently by voting (Elliott 2023) only makes sense in a democracy where institutions can function excellently if citizens do their share. The same normative considerations do not arise in an electoral autocracy, as citizens have no moral reason to ensure it functions excellently. Second, undemocratic electoral regimes may also give rise to special moral considerations that do not apply to democracies at all—even non-ideal ones. A pluralist, moderately specific approach, which I argue for, makes sense of both the normative continuity between and distinctness of a democratic and an undemocratic ethics of voting, respectively. On the one hand, it recognizes that general moral considerations such as the pursuit of justice through electoral institutions cut across regimes and are undeniably relevant to the ethics of voting. This accounts for our sense of continuity: to wit, that from ideal through non-ideal democracies to undemocratic electoral regimes, voters face similar moral challenges. On the other hand, a moderately specific approach also recognizes that regime-specific considerations play a significant role in the ethics of voting. Accordingly, an undemocratic ethics of voting cannot simply replicate or apply a democratic one, despite considerable similarities. I will illustrate the different methodological approaches and the superiority of the moderately specific approach through examining the ethics of protest voting.