The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine marked a pivotal shift in European political dynamics, particularly for parties previously sympathetic to the Putin regime. Initial assessments of far-right populist parties revealed a notable increase in assertiveness toward Russia; however, some of these parties have adopted, at best, a neutral stance. Contrary to expectations of far-right unification following the 2024 European Parliament elections, the far-right bloc remains divided between the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and the newly formed Patriots of Europe. These divisions are also evident in other EU institutions, such as the European Council, which, during Hungary's presidency in the latter half of 2024, was held hostage by the Orbán regime.
This article examines how the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has influenced the cooperation between far-right parties by focusing on three dimensions: ideological exchange, policy alignment, and mutual support in the most relevant international organization (IO), such as the EU, Council of Europe, UN and OSCE. In the EU, we will be focusing on their cooperation in the European Parliament and the Council. Particular attention is given to far-right actors in government, with a focus on Fidesz (Hungary) and Law and Justice (Poland)—two parties that, between 2015 and 2023, formed a "backsliding coalition," shielding each other at the Council and European Council levels. The analysis uses this broader time frame (2015–2023) and a wider analytical scope, examining not only European Parliament votes during this period but also various Council Art.7 hearings since 2018. Additionally, we look at Italy and, where possible, the Netherlands, as both states have since lately dominant far-right parties in government. Beyond the EU, this article explores the Council of Europe, which plays a central role in the far-right’s joint efforts on sovereignty, regional influence, and resistance to liberal democratic norms. A secondary focus is placed on the UN and OSCE, where far-right governments occasionally align on broader sovereignty or human rights issues but diverge on Russia.
Our findings indicate that while the invasion initially helped bridge longstanding divides within the far-right on Russian policy, these gaps have since widened on the party level. At the governmental level, relations between Fidesz and Law and Justice initially froze following the invasion but have since significantly improved. With the loss of Law and Justice in Poland, the Meloni government has emerged as the leading far-right government opposing Russia, albeit internally divided on the issue. Meanwhile, top leaders of the new Netherlands' new far-right government have sought to dispel concerns about a shift toward Russia.
