In many countries, direct democracy is considered an innovative means to supplement parliamentary democracy, effectively countering obvious symptoms of crisis, such as party discontent and political inactivity. Crucial issues in this regard include not only the ‘optimal design’ of popular initiatives and referendums, but also the question how these institutions can be introduced at all within a system of representative government. Against this background, the popular initiative in itself might prove to be a particularly suitable and effective instrument for expanding citizen participation rights. On the one hand, public demand for ‘more direct democracy’ is generally met with broad support which makes the instruments’ revocation, once implemented, most difficult. On the other hand, direct democracy applied ‘in its own case’ could cause a ‘domino effect’, which may eventually lead to a more fundamental change of the representative system than it would have been possible in a purely parliamentary reform process. Exactly this situation can be detected in the German Länder where the use of popular initiatives and referendums has become much more frequent during the last two decades. Not less than one fourth of these popular votes have referred to an extension of direct democracy itself. Relevant domino effects have appeared as well, but not everywhere; there are rather considerable differences between individual Länder. The proposed paper seeks to explain the different paths of expanding direct democratic institutions in the German Länder. Our main target is to identify the contextual circumstances favoring an extension of direct democratic rights, which then might spill-over onto other states. We argue that this effect is dependent on three factors: (a) the size of the state, (b) the structure of party systems and party governments as well as (c) constitutional traditions.
