Understanding the Role of Political Institutions in External Voting: A Large-N Comparison

This study investigates the role of political institutions in shaping the implementation of external voting processes. By addressing the question, How do political institutions work behind the implementation of external voting?, we aim to identify institutional patterns that influence these processes and their policy changes, as well as examine their correlation with political system and electoral rule features. To achieve this, we constructed a Large-N dataset that integrates data on electoral logistics, political system characteristics, and institutional mechanisms behind external voting. Specifically, we propose merging existing datasets (EVVR, MER, POLCON and V-DEM), leveraging its potential to track policy changes over time. This approach enables us to analyze critical moments in policy implementation: the initial de jure emigrant enfranchisement (time 1 [T1]), its regulation (T2), and subsequent policy changes or readjustments (T3). For the latter, we propose developing an indicator of veto players in the transnational arena to capture the dynamics of policy evolution. This work makes two key contributions. First, from a political economy perspective, it expands the framework of analysis on how veto players and political institutions operate in non-traditional electoral contexts. Second, it contributes to the growing literature on the complexity of policymaking and migration governance, highlighting the intricate interplay between electoral systems, institutional actors, and global mobility.