Executive Personalization and Constraints Amidst the COVID-19 Pandemic

This paper investigates the personalization of political power, a rising trend observed across diverse political systems, which has gained increased prominence during the COVID-19 pandemic. Traditionally associated with authoritarian regimes, executive personalization has begun to manifest more strongly within democracies. However, existing frameworks offer limited tools to measure and explain its variations across contexts. While much of the literature conceptualizes personalization as a power shift toward the chief executive, less attention has been paid to the role of political actors who constrain executive authority. This study addresses this gap by examining the dynamics between chief executives and these constraining actors. Using an original conceptual framework and stratified random sampling, we analyze 30 cases from the Global South during the pandemic, identifying the mechanisms through which executives have (un)successfully personalized power. By focusing on primary sources, we shed light on the key actors involved in either reinforcing or resisting executive consolidation of power. Our findings reveal that the personalization of power transcends regime types, with similar dynamics occurring in both authoritarian and democratic settings. The study's insights have broad implications for understanding political power during crises, not only during the COVID-19 pandemic but for the phenomenon of executive personalization more generally.