Knowledge Exclusion: from epistemic injustice to hermeneutical death

In this paper, I address the problem of how individuals are denied recognition as valid knowers of their own experiences of pain and situations of social indignation that demand justice. I examine this phenomenon through the lens of Miranda Fricker’s concept of epistemic injustice and José Medina’s notion of hermeneutical death. Fricker’s framework reveals the often overlooked, insidious effects of power relations within the ethical and political dimensions of our epistemic lives. Building on this insight, I explore how the denial of epistemic recognition and entrenched power asymmetries evolve from cases of epistemic injustice into the more extreme condition of hermeneutical death. In these situations, individuals are not only misrecognized as communicators, but are ultimately stripped of their capacity to develop and exercise their voice. This analysis is particularly pertinent in contexts where demands for social justice emerge, yet the social identity of the person leads to a radical curtailment of their hermeneutical agency. Such curtailment manifests as a loss or drastic reduction of one’s voice, interpretative abilities, and status as a participant in the processes of meaning-making. How does one progress from a mere lack of recognition to the complete inability to articulate one’s perspective? My conclusion posits that this shift is symptomatic of deeper structural power dynamics, such as patriarchy and misogyny, that impose a normative image upon society. Crucially, this normative imposition is not solely about exclusion; it is compounded by an emotional inability to empathize with diverse social identities. In essence, both ideological and affective polarizations prevent us from fully acknowledging the experiences and voices of those who deviate from the imposed norm, thereby perpetuating the cycle of exclusion and silencing that characterizes epistemic injustice, ultimately culminating in its most radical form: hermenutical death.