How strategic are party and youth wing members in leadership elections?

Party members hold a monopoly over leadership selection in most democracies. Yet, surprisingly little is known about their preferences. Given that members—particularly those in youth wings—are often portrayed as more ideologically extreme than party elites, democratizing leadership selection could affect how parties balance policy versus electoral considerations. Using a conjoint experiment with over 5,000 party and youth wing members in Portugal, I investigate the extent to which members trade off their policy preferences for electoral viability in leadership contests. Results reveal a strong overall preference for policy proximity, even at potential electoral costs; however, members tolerate moderate policy divergences when candidates offer clear electoral advantages. Contrary to prevailing assumptions, youth wing members’ behavior is indistinguishable from that of senior members, tempering fears that youth wings push parties toward extreme positions. Ideological extremism and issue salience modestly amplify the weight that members place on policy congruence, but motivations for joining the party do not condition these policy–electoral trade-offs. These findings illuminate key micro-foundations of endogenous party change, nuancing expectations that democratizing leadership selection or expanding youth wing influence has a radicalizing effect. In so doing, they carry broader implications for theories of spatial and issue competition, intra-party democracy, candidate selection methods, and emerging studies on party youth wings.