In Defense of Noncitizenism

Political theory, and the study of political systems more broadly, are dominated by pervasive methodological and ideological citizenism. That is, there is a presumption first that citizenship is the only recognisable relationship that a person can have with a State, and second, that everyone has access to some citizenship that is appropriate to them. In this paper, I argue that a political theory rooted only in citizenism is inadequate. I suggest further that where citizenism is banal and presumed, it is more insidious and can produce theories and approaches which are not only inadequate but also pernicious. Considering citizenship regimes critically indicates that there are not simply empowered citizens on the one hand and others with no relationship with the State at all on the other. Many people find themselves in complex and changing relationships with the States with most power over their lives. Some people, while being legal citizens, may also have to live out their lives to some extent despite the institutions of a State or States. Others may not be legal citizens, but live in some ways thanks to State institutions. I consider some powerful work that has set out to address this within the language of citizenship (e.g. Elizabeth Cohen’s citizenship continuum and Engin Isin’s acts of citizenship, and citizenship from below), but I conclude that it is not possible to capture the nature of these politics using the language of citizenship alone. As I present it, whereas ‘non-citizenship’, with a hyphen, refers to a negation of citizenship, understood merely as a lack or absence of a relationship, ‘noncitizenship’, without a hyphen, refers to a substantive relationship, and one which can adhere alongside citizenship. It is as foundational to the system of States as citizenship and is not dependent upon citizenship (or lack thereof). A person may experience both citizenship and noncitizenship to varying extents in their relationship with a State. Noncitizenism prioritises the perspectives of people insofar as they must live and act politically despite prevailing political structures, understanding them as being in a thick and real political relationship not merely a negation of citizenship. Unlike other –isms, noncitizenism focuses on the political relationship itself without presuming what factors have produced it. Our world is built by and for people who, unusually, experience the world mainly as citizens. It is, then, unsurprising, that citizenship is mostly presumed. The long history of citizenism, its strength in canonical texts, and indeed the citizenship experiences of those who dominate in political theory, can make it difficult to address the implications of noncitizenship. However, this difficulty makes it no less necessary. This paper offers a defense of noncitizenism and suggests some methodological and theoretical approaches to its realisation.