Unveiling the dynamics of change, scholars have devoted significant attention to the impact of established interests. It has been found that ‘veto players’ can block reforms through their formal representative authority, and that ‘coalitions’ of political and business interests can stop reforms through lobbying. On the face of it, the concept of ‘transnational veto player’ is logically inconsistent. Veto players are located in formal constituencies that can be found in defined polities, while the concept of the transnational lies between the domestic and international realms where formal orders exist. Focusing on the semi-formal networked patterns of financial governance and the role that public, private and hybrid actors play at the interface between the various levels of governance, this contribution develops the concept of ‘transnational veto players’ as an explanatory tool of processes of stability and change in global economic governance. Specifically, there is a range of actors with decisive roles within defined domestic and international polities that also belong to policy communities that can only be understood as transnational. For example, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is an international standard-setting body that makes the rules for global banking. Its members are central bankers and regulators of large advanced and emerging economies. Within their own constituencies they have the power to block institutional change yet the terms of debate for policy discussions – as well as much of the wrangling over who wins and loses from particular policy reforms – are informed by their multiple associations and roles at the transnational level.
