Applications and Limitations of Kantian Institutional Thinking

Kant’s philosophical project can, in one light, be conceived of as a project of instituting lasting peace in various communities. The perpetual disagreements in metaphysics, and thus conflicts between different philosophical schools, were resolved through a comprehensive critique of pure reason. The idea of the ethical community in Kant’s Religion secures our peace by exiting the moral state of nature and helps prevent the corruption of our disposition towards humanity. The institution of the state as a mechanism of securing the ‘mine-and-thine' of property establishes lasting peace between individuals. Finally, Perpetual peace between states is to be secured through an interlocking set of dispositions governing both how states relate to each other and how individuals ought to be treated in such a system. While Kant certainly has a view towards diagnosing the problem and identifying the obstacles towards how peace might be achieved, the actual work of instituting pacific frameworks remains elusive. The task of translating a project for peace into a real-existing institutional practice may be more properly assigned and delegated to people operating in the world, being a practical problem. However, we can ask ourselves what guidance Kant’s work gives that may help with the project of realizing in concreto what is only articulated in abstracto in Kant’s writings. This paper will examine some of the ways in which Kant envisages individuals interacting within various institutional contexts. Primarily, I will highlight some of the methodological considerations in understanding Kant’s framework and in seeing how, e.g. the legal framework of Towards Perpetual Peace, is to be implemented and to be given a concrete instantiation. I will also highlight some of the strengths and weaknesses for this particular framework, particularly with regards to how Kant’s own proposals, while powerful in their implications, are fairly moderate. Further, I will argue that Kant’s framework for thinking about pacific institutions are only useful to the extent that they hone in on essential characteristics of high level institutions as they regulate the behavior of individuals rather than of communities. While this presents particular limitations, this may not be a loss for philosophy (even though it may be frustrating for the engaged philosopher thinking through particular problems). Finally, following some of the remarks of Margit Ruffing’s (2015) on Kant’s Religion in its ethical and political dimensions, I will examine what guidance Kant’s writings provide on further anthropological and cultural reflection on what role institutions play in constituting communities. Here, some space for teleological reflection is made on the model of Kant’s remarks in the closing sections of the Critique of Judgment. Here, we can consider how certain institutions promote either cultures of skill or cultures of discipline and how both should be approached in bringing about lasting peace.