In recent years, Latin America has been deemed of strategic importance by China.
Chinese activities in Latin America shall be analyzed in the different realms of economy, security, institutions and soft power.
The central guiding question is: Can we identify patterns of a specific authoritarian foreign policy?
In order to analyze this question, first we outline the criteria for distinguishing elements of democratic and authoritarian foreign policy in general, a task seldom done so far in foreign policy analysis. Second, we analyze Chinese activities in Latin America in the above mentioned realms, trying to find matching patterns between the general criteria of authoritarian foreign policy and Chinese foreign policy in Latin America. Third, we examine the relations to authoritarian countries of the region, namely Cuba and Venezuela (the latter being at least semi-authoritarian)in particular.
The underlying hypothesis is that China is following on the surface a strictly pragmatic foreign policy approach in Latin America, not considering possible ideological aspects such as promoting authoritarian values and supporting especially authoritarian regimes. Therefore, norms and values seem to play no role at first glance. This does not seem to be a special authoritarian foreign policy. But the emphasis on pragmatism and the (at least rhetorical) denial of values and norms as guidelines for decisions, as we see “Chinese” pragmatism, may exactly constitute a special feature of authoritarian foreign policy. Additionally, this pragmatism seems to be Janus-faced. We may identify values like the Beijing-Consensus, South-South-cooperation and non-intervention in internal affairs as non-Western values promoted by China. But the question is if these ostensibly “neutral” values are really guiding Chinese foreign policy or if they are just rhetorical. A question we trace by analyzing Chinese “Realpolitik” in Latin America.
