The aim of this paper is to offer a better explanation and potential political framework for a peaceful management of potentially conflictual power transitions in the international system. Even though scholars disagree about the exact timing, there is a widespread belief that we are rapidly approaching an age of power transition. One approach that focuses on this phenomenon is the Power-Transition-Theory established by A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler. This theory warns that situations in which a (declining) hegemon is approached and eventually overtaken by rising powers often escalate into conflict or even war. Most variants of PTT specifically allow for the possibility of a peaceful power transition, the requirement being satisfaction with the status quo of the international order on the part of the rising power. Oddly, however, PTT does neither offer satisfying conceptions nor operationalizations of its satisfaction variable. One first approximation of how to satisfy a rising power could be offered by the concept of liberal hegemony developed by G. John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan. It is based on three criteria: “bonding, binding and institutionalized voice opportunities”. The partner states are thus part of the system and not mere subordinates. They can influence the institutional rules and do not have to fear the dominance of the hegemon. An international system organized in this way should fuel much less dissatisfaction than any coercive order. We argue that even liberal hegemony, however, seems to be predominated by a rational focus of function and form. To maximize the possible satisfaction effect, questions of ideational matter, most notably justice should also be addressed and incorporated.
