In a very short period of time, tensions with both the EU’s most direct military threat and its strongest ally have exposed the continent’s manifest incapacity to defend itself, and calls to re-armament have started echoing across the political spectrum. While this objective is embraced with enthusiasm across member states, there is far less agreement concerning who the EU should arm, and how. More specifically, the EU member states diverge in their support for outright EU-level defence cooperation versus mere intergovernmental coordination of complementary national procurement. In this paper, we investigate the domestic institutional ori-
gins of political demand for European defence integration. We argue that variation in governance ecosystems—whether public or private—explains preferences for co-operation (centralized EU-level resources) or competition (intergovernmental control). In public governance systems, where strong formal and informal ties between the defence sector and the state prevail, firms can overcome collective action problems and mobilize political demand for EU-level cooperation to secure industrial advantages. In contrast, private governance systems, where such ties are weaker
and state discretion is more pronounced, are more likely to generate demand for coordination, as inefficient firms pressure governments to retain national control. We test this argument in a two-step process. First, we conduct a network analysis of employment relationships among defence sector employees and governments in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Poland to assess the extent to which they are 'public' or 'private' governance ecosystems. Then, we conduct a discourse network analysis of defence policy statements of actors in each member state, using patterns of narrative congruence across political, bureaucratic, and industrial actors, to assess the extent to which governance ecosystems shape political demand. Our findings demonstrate how governance ecosystems provide an explanation for variation in demand which defy standard IPE expectations that assume a shared sectoral preference among firms in the defense industry. This paper contributes to understanding how domestic governance structures condition preference formation and contestation in EU defence policy.
