While carbon taxes are frequently advocated as the most efficient means of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the politics of direct cost imposition are such that few governments have opted to explicitly raise taxes on carbon. In this context, this paper exploits large cross-national differences in rates of carbon-energy taxation to uncover the correlates and constraints of carbon tax policy, and the conditions under which raising the effective price of carbon may become politically possible. Building on insights from qualitative studies of carbon taxation, this paper tests the relative impact of several hypotheses found in the comparative public policy literature offered to explain differences in rates of effective carbon energy taxation. I develop a large-N cross-national study that brings together several datasets, and find considerable support for the hypothesized relationship between electoral systems and the varying incentives of political parties to raise carbon energy taxes. The paper highlights the value-added of large-N cross-national empirical research in the study of carbon taxation, and raises questions for further empirical and theoretical research.
