The Missing Link in Macro-Quantitative Political Science Research: The Case of Electoral System Choice

This article critically discusses macro-quantitative political science research using the example of the debate on electoral system choice. An expert survey among historians specialized in political, economic, and social history in the period 1890-1939 shows that country experts remain unconvinced by the currently dominant explanations in political science. This negative assessment cannot be explained by a general reluctance on the part of historians to endorse quantitative approaches, generalization, and comparison. We present an alternative explanation for this negative assessment. We develop our argument in three steps. First, we argue that political decisions are made in a historical context. In particular, these decisions are made in presence of multiple, non-independent issues on the political agenda. Second, in such a context macro-political actors (e.g. parties, governments, interest groups) are likely to suffer from collective decision-making problems, thereby making collective behavior virtually impossible to predict. Third, while we might assume the absence of collective decision-making problems, such an assumption is only useful iff the theoretical predictions are tested. This is, however, for several reasons rarely done. Macro-quantitative approaches are thus often unsuitable for causal analysis in political science research.