From support to instrumentalization of the anti-gender movements? Тhe case of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church

Like in other Balkan countries, the Orthodox church in Bulgaria became prominent actor in the anti-gender campaigns, but in contrast to other countries, its role has been limited to the one of supporter and not of instigator. However, since 2024 the Bulgarian Orthodox Church has started to act in a more strategic way by instrumentalizing the anti-gender discourse for the goal of increasing its religious and political influence. During the first anti-gender mobilizations in Bulgaria in 2018 against the ratification of the Istanbul Convention the “religious” section of the anti-gender camp was composed mainly of evangelical groups and NGOs formed and funded by transnational networks. Paradoxically, these non-Orthodox religious actors assumed the role of “defenders” of Christian values and “traditional family” despite their dubious connections to Bulgarian history and culture. Within this heterogenous religious camp, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church acted in a reactive and volatile way (Merdjanova, 2021). Still, its support for the anti-gender movement was crucial for the elaboration of the anti-gender identity frame of the “sanctity of the family” (Gueorgieva and Petrova, 2024). Following this first stage of the anti-gender movement, the Bulgarian Orthodox church got co-opted by the state to provide legitimation for its anti-gender politics. In 2021 the Bulgarian Constitutional Court required the opinion of the Church before announcing that the Constitution of Bulgaria recognizes only the biological differences between the two sexes and no other meaning of “sex” or “gender” should be used in the Bulgarian legislation. Crucially, this decision motivated the ban on legal gender change for trans-people. In 2024, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, headed by a new patriarch with pro-Russian positions, started instrumentalizing its past and current support for the anti-gender campaigns by establishing more active relations with the government. A clear sign of these connections is the preparation of legislative changes introducing compulsory religious education in schools. By systematizing research on the links between the national state and the Orthodox Church in Bulgaria I argue that there is no evidence of “neosecularization” (Merdjanova, 2021), but rather of processes of desecularization (Berger, 1999) in response to political instability and social changes.