DEFECTION IN SILENCE: THEORY OF ELITE SUBVERSION IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

The prevailing scholarship on authoritarian stability emphasizes elite defection as a precursor to regime collapse. Yet, contrary to overt confrontations, powerful elites in authoritarian states—endowed with substantial resources and influence—often remain loyal despite internal dissatisfaction. This research examines the puzzle of powerful elites’ loyalty, proposing that beneath the surface of loyalty lies a spectrum of subversion strategies. Drawing on Hirschman’s Exit, Voice, and Loyalty framework, the study advances a novel alternative strategy—defection in silence—in which covert tactics, both societal and institutional, are used to destabilize the incumbent’s authority. The theoretical argument is substantiated through a comparative case study of the Soviet Union and Turkey. Methodologically, the project employs qualitative analysis, including in-depth interviews with key political figures and observers in Turkey and analysis of Soviet elite memoirs, to uncover the covert mechanisms elites deploy to navigate and manipulate authoritarian dynamics. In doing so, the study outlines a path for understanding the hidden political undercurrents that may precipitate regime transformation from within.