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Negotiating the “Union of Equality”: How Gender Equality Norms Shape Decision-Making Processes and Outcomes in the Council of the European Union

European Union
Gender
Institutions
Negotiation
Member States
Policy-Making
Caroline Godard
University of Limerick
Caroline Godard
University of Limerick

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Abstract

The first European Commission led by Ursula von der Leyen (2019–2024) has been marked by significant legislative activity on gender equality+, offering a key opportunity to study policymaking in this area (Abels et al. 2025). The Council of the European Union’s role in gender equality policymaking had previously received limited attention (Abels et al. 2021), though recent studies examine disputes over concepts like “gender” and “intersectionality” among member states (de Silva 2025; Kantola and Gaweda 2026). This paper explores how gender equality norms shape Council decision-making. Norms such as “gender mainstreaming,” institutionalised since initiatives like the 1995 UN Beijing Conference (Elgström 2000), remain underexplored in terms of their impact on Council processes and outcomes. Using process tracing, I analyse how member states resolved disagreements over “intersectional discriminations” in the Pay Transparency Directive and criminal law provisions on online gender-based violence in the Directive on Combating Violence against Women. I focus on how gender equality norms interact with arguing, bargaining, and the Council’s consensus-seeking norm. While such norms are not fully shared, as evidenced by disputes over the concept of “gender", overt opposition is often avoided due to a “taboo on direct opposition” (Ahrens 2018). The findings show that when norms are not shared, they function mainly as a logic of appropriateness, constraining acceptable arguments and limiting open deliberation in favour of strategic bargaining. Conversely, shared norms enable substantive deliberation and make the consensus norm more demanding, requiring minority states to justify their positions more strongly.