The Paradox of Democratic Inclusion: Why Some Sub-Saharan African States Fail to Adopt Reserved Seats for Women

Reserved seats for women have increased legislative representation in sub-Saharan Africa. However, their adoption follows a counterintuitive pattern because they institutionalise more readily under authoritarian and hybrid regimes than in pluralistic or competitive systems. This study argues that explaining this divergence requires examining institutional mechanisms rather than aggregate regime classifications. It identifies associational autonomy and executive constraints as key features shaping adoption. Using original data on all reserved-seat adoption attempts in sub-Saharan Africa from 1980 to 2024, logistic regression analysis reveals that these mechanisms interact. Their combined presence produces a compounded deterrent effect exceeding either mechanism alone. This uncovers a paradox of democratic inclusion (reserved seats are least likely to succeed where advocacy is most active and institutional constraints are strongest). The study contributes to veto player theory and feminist institutionalism by demonstrating how institutional resistance to gender-transformative reform emerges from the interaction between structural veto configurations and gendered institutional norms.