Leaders, Polarization and Democracy

The paper examines political leadership in Latin America through a comparative analysis of Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile. In Argentina, President Javier Milei exemplifies an emergent form of anti-establishment leadership characterized by strong media influence, a personalized political style, and strategic reliance on constitutional tools such as decrees and vetoes to advance policy priorities despite limited legislative support. His approach illustrates how leaders with weak party structures can compensate through communicational dominance and coalition-building. In contrast, Chile’s President Gabriel Boric represents a type of leadership rooted in social movements and political coalitions. Although Boric maintains substantial moral legitimacy among younger and activist constituencies, the translation of this social capital into institutional power remains constrained by legislative dynamics. His administration faced significant institutional fragmentation, requiring sustained negotiation and consensus-building to implement reforms. Uruguay provides a counterpoint within the region: its political leadership is typically more institutionalized, party-centered, and stable, reflecting a long-standing democratic culture that moderates executive volatility. Uruguayan presidents tend to govern through structured coalitions and established party mechanisms, contrasting with the more personalized or disruptive models emerging elsewhere. A comparison of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay underscores the decisive yet varied role that political parties play in shaping contemporary Latin American leadership. In Argentina, Javier Milei’s rise illustrates what occurs when party structures are weak or only recently formed: leadership becomes highly personalized, reliant on media visibility, and less embedded in stable legislative coalitions. Chile’s experience with Gabriel Boric shows a different dynamic—parties remain relevant, but their fragmentation and ideological diversity limit the executive’s ability to translate coalition support into coherent governance. Uruguay offers the sharpest contrast. Its long-established, programmatic parties provide presidents with durable institutional backing, enabling more predictable policy-making and moderating individual leadership styles. Taken together, these cases reveal that while personalized leadership is increasingly visible in the region, the strength and configuration of party systems continue to determine whether presidents govern through negotiation and institutional continuity or through more volatile, individualized strategies.