ho Evades Matters: Group Identity, Social Norms, and Tax Attitudes

How do social norms and group identity shape tax attitudes? While citizens are often described as conditional cooperators, it remains unclear whether they respond equally to in-group and out-group behavior. We develop an identity-conditioned account of peer effects in tax morale, distinguishing two mechanisms---conformity, alignment with perceived in-group norms, fairness reappraisal, and reactions to unequal burden-sharing. A nationally representative survey experiment in Turkey randomly varied the ethnicity and tax behavior of a business owner in a vignette. Observing tax evasion sharply reduced respondents' tax morale, but only when the evader was a co-ethnic; identical out-group evasion had no effect. Mechanism tests show shifts in conformity beliefs, not fairness perceptions. In-group evasion also depressed support for redistribution, while information about access to public goods did not. These results reveal that social norms of compliance are group-bound, highlighting how identity shapes the microfoundations of cooperation and the design of effective fiscal communication.