An atmosphere of euphoria branded the victory of Democrat Barack Obama, in the battle for the US presidency in 2008. Expectations were high at home and abroad, not only because of his proposals but also due to his unusual biography for American political patterns. However, these expectations did not take into consideration the inherent power constraints tied to politics, which elevate the chances of unrealistic changes, and easy frustration. These constraints often arise in the period of transition between one government and another and gain relief after the end of the honeymoon period between the politician and the citizenry. The heavy legacy of the previous president clearly shows the narrow margin available for the new Administration to act out its own agenda. Already in the middle of his term, and Obama still has to manage Republican garbage and face structural problems, doing what is possible, and not what he would like to. These elements contribute to dramatizing a political mood that is no longer so favorable. The longer this oppositional environment persists, the less flexibility Obama will have to deal with international matters. Unless these matters themselves become an important item in the domestic agenda. Do internal constraints have to turn Obama’s agenda more conservative? Will an external event be necessary to forge a consensus, so that the present Administration can have an identity marker? The aim of this paper is to follow evolution of Obama’s Foreign Affairs and verify if there has been a change in its profile.
