Strategic Subnational (Non)Compliance with EU Environmental and Climate Legislation

The European Union’s ambition to deliver on the European Green Deal has renewed long-standing questions about its ability to deliver on the implementation of those policy objectives across its Member States. Although much of the literature on EU implementation explains noncompliance through administrative capacity, institutional misfit, or legal complexity, far less attention has been given to the political dynamics unfolding at the subnational level, which does the bulk of the implementation work of European environmental and climate policies on the ground. Yet these subnational actors often operate under distinct political incentives, varying levels of territorial autonomy, and public preferences, all of which may shape their willingness to comply with EU legislation. We also know little about how domestic political dynamics shape the EU’s ability to meet its policy goals, particularly amongst increasing support for climate-sceptic parties and the de-prioritization of European Green Deal agenda. Moving beyond capacity-focused explanations, this study conceptualizes subnational authorities in contexts with discretion at implementation phase as actors capable of exercising agency within multilevel governance structures. Such discretion can allow for strategic delay, obstruction, or reinterpretation of EU obligations. This paper therefore examines an understudied but increasingly consequential phenomenon of subnational noncompliance with EU environmental and climate legislation. Drawing on an original dataset of multilevel infringements across Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Spain (2002–2024), the paper tests whether political disagreement across levels of government, public opinion, and institutional autonomy shape the likelihood of subnational authorities failing to implement EU rules. By combining multilevel data in a comparative cross-national research design, the paper aims to advance debates on EU policy implementation in three ways. First, it shifts analytical attention from member states as unitary actors to the political behavior of subnational authorities. Second, it develops a theoretical framework that conceptualizes subnational noncompliance as potentially strategic rather than solely capacity driven. Third, it contributes to broader discussions on the governance and legitimacy of EU environmental and climate policy by examining how internal political contestation shapes the Union’s ability to deliver on its green commitments. In doing so, the findings contribute to understanding the multilevel political constraints that complicate the EU’s ability to reach Green Deal and environmental commitments, while also speaking to broader discussions on democratic accountability and the legitimacy of EU rulemaking.