Shaping decision-making in security issues, strategic culture (SC) is a function of historical experiences, geo-strategic-material circumstances as well as of peculiar identity and elite’s perceptions. We define SC as 1) the combination of ideational/material elements; and 2) “intermestic”, deriving from national and international pressure. SC results as the win-set comprising the options considered available and normatively acceptable. Despite the difficult operationalization of the ideational aspect of SC, we believe that it can be objectively studied. The existence and persistence of influencing norms can be measured against three criteria: clarity-specificity of the norm; durability; acceptability-accordance with the normative environment. To verify the existence, strength and persistence of a European SC, we test it against a “hostile environment”, concretely a non-EU framework. Through the analysis of the participation of European member states to United Nations missions in the Middle East, and in particular in the enhanced UNIFIL and UNTSO, this paper argues that if we consider strategic culture as “intermestic”, its origin relies not only in the national environment the CSDP actors are coming from, but also in the international instances in which those actors are already integrated. The European participation in UNIFIL and UNTSO can thus give lessons to learn on where to look for while discussing the existence of a European Strategic culture. Conclusion draws to admitting that, despite very positive signals from the military personnel for the progressive convergence of national strategic norms towards an ideational platform shared by EU member States, the lack of political will for a coherent strategy concerning foreign and defense policy inhibits the consolidation of a proper European strategic culture.
