Ex-Post Lobbying on Due Diligence Regulations – The Central Role of Expectations

Even though it was adopted relatively recently with broad political and public support, the European Union’s Regulation on Deforestation-free Products (EUDR) is currently facing significant headwinds: A second postponement of its application date looks increasingly likely, and critics of the regulation are advocating for its inclusion in the Commission’s ‘simplification’ agenda, potentially weakening key provisions. Why is a regulation that formally entered into force more than two years ago facing so much uncertainty? The paper investigates the ex-post lobbying – i.e., lobbying that occurs after a regulation’s adoption – surrounding the EUDR. It argues that the novelty and complexity of the EUDR, and of supply chain due diligence relations more broadly, provide fertile ground for different actors to employ discursive strategies in order to promote their policy preferences even after the legislation has been enacted. In particular, we highlight the central role of expectations during the transition phase between a regulation’s adoption and application date: Actors can strategically seek to shape others’ expectations surrounding the regulation’s implementation, and leverage them to influence policy outcomes. Applying the discursive agency approach, we conceptualize the shaping of expectations as a distinct strategic practice. Evidence from over 175 documents and interviews with stakeholders suggest that many actors indeed frequently construct expectations of supply chain disruptions, harms to businesses and threats to overall EU competitiveness if the regulation were implemented as adopted, using these expectations as basis a to argue for delay and re-opening of the regulation.