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Technocracy or Not, This is the Question: Can Party System Predict the Number of Technocrats in Governments?

Government
Political Competition
Quantitative
Party Systems
Alessandro Di Biagio
University of Cologne
Alessandro Di Biagio
University of Cologne

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Abstract

In the last three decades, Europe has seen an improvement of number of technocrats – non-partisan, non-elected experts appointed based on their technical competence (Vittori et al., 2023) – in governments. This paper examines whether the characteristics of party systems can predict the share of in 30 European countries from 2000 to 2024. Building on theories of party system dynamics and representation, the study investigates how structural features of political systems shape the prevalence of technocratic governance. In doing so, this study employs fractional regression models to test the relationship between number of technocratic appointments and two key variables: ideological polarization, and party system fragmentation. In contexts where ideological divides are deep, the ability to form stable coalitions is weakened, making technocrats attractive alternatives to partisan ministers. Conversely, higher levels of party institutionalization are associated with fewer technocratic appointments, suggesting that robust, programmatic parties are better able to manage executive responsibilities. Instead, party system fragmentation (ENPP), and electoral volatility are not correlated with technocrat appointment. This is in line with the growing literature that views technocratic appointments not simply as responses to crisis (short government longevity) or voter dissatisfaction (high volatility), but as strategic adaptations to evolving institutional constraints and partisan challenges.