Europe’s Last Chance to Lead

The simultaneous return of great-power rivalry, the fragmentation of the liberal international order, and the intensification of regional security challenges compel the EU to redefine its global role - or risk losing geopolitical agency even within Europe. The emerging world order is no longer characterized by linear hierarchy or stable liberal multilateralism. Instead, it displays a dual structure: globally bipolar, driven by the systemic rivalry between the United States and China, yet regionally multipolar, with influential middle powers shaping outcomes across strategic theaters, including Europe. This hybrid order is further complicated by Russia’s revisionist aggression, the growing assertiveness of China in Europe’s neighbourhood, and the strategic hedging of actors across the Global South. For the EU, this fluid environment creates both unprecedented challenges and a narrow window of opportunity to consolidate its capacity as a geopolitical actor. In Europe itself, multipolarity is already visible. Although the United States remains the EU’s indispensable ally, Washington’s long-term commitment to European security can no longer be taken for granted – whether due to domestic polarization, shifting strategic priorities toward the Indo-Pacific, or growing transactionalism in U.S. foreign policy across administrations. A security architecture that relies exclusively on the United States is neither politically sustainable nor strategically desirable. This raises a fundamental question for the EU: Can Europe become whole and free without significantly strengthening its own strategic capabilities? The answer increasingly depends on the EU’s ability to pursue deeper integration in foreign, security, and defence policy. “Europe whole and free” in a global "Zeitenwende” requires both continued enlargement and a more coherent CFSP and CSDP, where enlargement is not merely a normative project; it is a geopolitical imperative in the face of Russian aggression, regional instability, and external authoritarian influence. Simultaneously, CFSP and CSDP must evolve into instruments capable of projecting stability and deterrence. This demands institutional reform, enhanced joint procurement, integrated capability development, and greater readiness to deploy civilian and military missions in the EU’s neighbourhood. Strategic autonomy, in this context, must be understood more broadly than military capability. The EU’s geopolitical relevance ultimately rests on its economic power. Sustainable growth, competitiveness in advanced technologies, and resilience in supply chains define the EU’s ability to act internationally. The EU therefore needs not only to strengthen the Single Market, but also to develop a more flexible and substantial fiscal capacity – a genuine EU budget capable of supporting industrial policy, innovation, defence investment, and green and digital transitions. Economic sovereignty and security sovereignty are increasingly inseparable. This paper argues that the EU stands before a historic choice. If it seizes the moment to define its strategic role, deepen integration, and equip itself with the political, economic, and military instruments befitting a great power, it can shape the evolving European and global order. If it hesitates, it risks strategic marginalization in a world where power is redistributed, competition intensifies, and agency favours those who adapt fastest.