One of the greatest tasks facing both biologists and many social scientists is explaining the evolution of cooperative behavior. Cooperation has been cited as the key to all major transitions in the history of life, from the advent of multicellular life to the development of complex societies in certain insect species. Yet similar examples of cooperative behavior can be easily found in other societies, and include emergent phenomena like that of long-lasting peace, functioning of international institutions, or even interactions at students’ dormitories. These examples can all be represented as systems in which agents’ individual goals are seemingly at odds with those of a larger group. Because of this commonality, game theory is increasingly being used to understand social dilemmas. Nevertheless, a fundamental aspect of the evolution of social behavior often remains unaddressed – regard for relative position vis á vis other players. Among biologist it is generally taken as fact that only relative fitness matters when explaining evolutionary processes. However, taking into account not only individual benefits but also one’s own position with respect to other agents has been slow to be incorporated into social sciences. Concepts such as interdependent preferences in microeconomics and relative gains in international relations do exist but there remains a need for a unifying framework incorporating social relativity into game theoretic explanations of behavior. We present a simple abstract model applicable to multiple scales, systems, and disciplines and show how it may better guide research on the evolution of social behavior and related policy issues.
