The Union Method to the Test: Assessing the Applicability of the Union Method in the Post-Lisbon Era.

This article examines the process of EU policy-making in the case of EU expenditure policies in the post-Lisbon era. Building on the competence-control theory, this article argues that Member States of the EU, which play a dominant role in the creation and amendment of the EU Treaties and in the procurement of resources at the EU level, need to empower intermediaries (e.g. the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Court of Justice) to harness specific competencies that are needed to create and implement these policies. Simultaneously, Member States need to establish mechanisms to control the intermediaries to prevent agency losses. According to the competence-control theory, EU Member States thus find themselves in a dilemma. They can either secure a high level of competence or put in place a strong control mechanism. However, they cannot achieve both simultaneously, as competence and control are inversely proportional. This article identifies this compromise with the term' Union method'. According to the Union method, Member States are willing to recruit and empower EU institutions while simultaneously institutionalising a dual control system. This system involves Member States sharing control over the creation phase of these policies, primarily through the ordinary legislative procedure, while maintaining robust oversight of the implementation phase of EU expenditure policies. This article developed four empirically testable hypotheses, based on the Union method, concerning the mechanisms the Member States put in place to govern the Commission's role in the creation and implementation of EU expenditure policies in the post-Lisbon era. H1: EU Member States share control over the creation of EU expenditure policies with the European Parliament by means of the ordinary legislative procedure. H2: Member States control the implementation of EU expenditure policies under shared management by directly participating in it jointly with the European Commission. H3: Member States control the implementation of EU expenditure policies under direct or indirect management by exercising a veto power over the approval of multiannual and annual work programmes. EU Member States exercise this veto power either by conferring implementing powers on the Commission to approve and amend these programmes under the examination procedure, or by conferring them on the Council of the EU under a Commission proposal. H4: If discretion is granted to the Commission to approve, suspend, or terminate the disbursement of funds under a conditionality regime, EU Member States retain control by exercising a veto power either by conferring implementing powers to the Commission under the examination procedure, or by conferring implementing powers to the Council of the EU under a proposal from the Commission. Thus, this article addresses the following research question: RQ: To what extent do these hypotheses apply to EU expenditure policies financed or guaranteed by the 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), the 2021-2027 MFF, and the Next Generation EU? Empirically, this article will test these four hypotheses in the context of the EU expenditure policies financed or guaranteed by the 2014-2020 MFF, the 2021-2027 MFF, and the Next Generation EU.