The Union Method to the Test: Assessing the Applicability of the Union Method in the Post-Lisbon Era.

This article examines the process of EU policy-making in the case of EU expenditure policies in the post-Lisbon era. Building on the competence-control theory, this article argues that Member States of the EU, which play a dominant role in the creation and amendment of the EU Treaties and in the procurement of resources at the EU level, need to empower intermediaries (e.g. the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Court of Justice) to harness specific competencies that are needed to create and implement these policies. Simultaneously, Member States need to establish mechanisms to control the intermediaries to prevent agency losses. According to the competence-control theory, EU Member States thus find themselves in a dilemma. They can either achieve a high level of competence or implement a strong control mechanism. However, they cannot achieve both simultaneously, as competence and control are inversely proportional. This article identifies this compromise with the term' Union method'. According to the Union method, Member States are willing to recruit and empower EU institutions while simultaneously institutionalising a dual control system. This system involves Member States sharing control over the creation phase of these policies, primarily through the ordinary legislative procedure, while maintaining robust oversight of the implementation phase of EU expenditure policies. Empirically, this article examines EU expenditure policies created using the ordinary legislative procedure and implemented through direct management, either alone or in combination, and focuses on the procedure for approving or amending multiannual/annual work programmes, which constitute key decisions in the implementation of these policies. In detail, this article aims to assess the compatibility of these procedures with the Union method and the degree of conflict that characterised the inter-institutional negotiations concerning this procedure. RQ1: Are EU expenditure policies created using the ordinary legislative procedure and implemented under direct management, alone or combined with other management modes, compatible with the Union method? RQ2: How conflictual was the process of inter-institutional negotiations between the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of the EU that led to the creation of these policies?