The same Eurosceptics, different skepticisms? An Ideological Understanding of Variations in Far-Right Party Euroscepticism in Europe

As a major driver to politicize the issue of European integration and a solid opponent to the EU model, far-right parties and their Euroscepticism require further academic attention, especially in the background of their political success and growing influence in both domestic and European politics in recent decades. The fact that far-right parties can be both anti-EU and pro-European, and there are clear variations within the Eurosceptic far right, calls for a move beyond simple dichotomies and an in-depth investigation into the rationale behind the variations. Although current discussions mostly emphasize a highly strategic and ambiguous state of far-right Euroscepticism, the role of ideology, should not be ignored in explaining the cross-country and cross-party variations. With a comparative study of how far-right parties in France, Germany and Italy, three core member states in the EU with influential far-right parties, frame the issue of European integration, I argue that the varying levels of Euroscepticism by far-right parties are not solely a product of the so-called ‘strategic ambiguity’ or ‘chameleonic populism’, but are long shaped by the ideology they hold, especially the parts related to the geopolitical thinking and the self-positioning of the parties. This paper contributes to the existing research by offering a novel perspective in understanding far-right party Euroscepticism and revealing the role of ideology in shaping the visions of Europe and related policy stances of far-right parties and in circumscribing their flexibility.