Contrasting and comparing EU and EU member states’ democracy support action in the Eastern Neighbourhood: Between consistency and complementarity

The purpose of this paper is to explore normative consistency and instrumental complementarity of democracy support efforts by EU institutions and Member States across the Eastern Neighbourhood. In doing so, the paper proposes a new analytical framework for evaluating democracy support, structured along two dimensions: normative consistency – the degree to which the EU and its Member States promote a shared set of democratic standards – and instrumental complementarity – the extent to which their operational approaches reinforce and compensate for each other. Employing a comparative case study analysis, the paper assesses consistency and complementarity across eight dimensions for all six Eastern Neighbourhood countries: Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus. The analysis reveals considerable variation in the democracy support models followed across the region. Ukraine and Moldova display both high consistency and high complementarity, reflecting, on aggregate mutually reinforcing EU and Member State approaches. Georgia exhibits high complementarity but low consistency: while instruments are well coordinated, normative fragmentation has limited strategic focus and has left space for democratic backsliding. Armenia, conversely, demonstrates high consistency but low complementarity as shared commitments to democracy promotion coexist with fragmented operational engagement. Azerbaijan and Belarus stand at the opposite end of the spectrum, with low consistency and low complementarity, as authoritarian resistance and restrictive conditions have reduced democracy support to a disjointed and largely reactive effort. In discussing the findings, the paper identifies sources of strength and weakness, risks and democracy support priorities, and cross-cutting implications across the region. First, democracy is increasingly being framed as a security good, risking the subordination of democratic objectives to stability imperatives. Second, while resilience has become a guiding principle since the 2016 EU Global Strategy, its meaning and operationalisation remain uneven, demanding more context-sensitive application. Third, technocratic tendencies of EU democracy support have prioritised governance outcomes over value entrenchment, limiting the societal embedding of democratic norms. Fourth, consistency and complementarity must be treated as mutually reinforcing but distinct principles: normative alignment does not automatically produce operational synergy, and vice versa. Nevertheless, both are essential for an effective democracy support strategy. Finally, across all six countries, institutionalised participation, judicial oversight, and executive accountability remain under-addressed, and should feature more prominently as priorities in future efforts.