Interbranch Impartiality

We examine how impartiality is maintained in systems of governance where public institutions whose roles span legal judgment, administrative coordination and executive authority interact continuously rather than operating in isolation. Instead of treating impartiality as a byproduct of formal independence, the analysis reconceives it as a practice shaped by ongoing interactions among institutions. Drawing on qualitative evidence from senior figures in the United Kingdom, the study shows that effective cooperation relies on a form of trust that enables institutions to depend on one another while remaining within their respective roles. Such confidence manifests differently across settings, but it consistently acts as a stabilizing force that allows interdependence to function without eroding autonomy. The paper develops a relational account of impartiality that links independence and institutional trust across procedural, functional and relational dimensions, and it argues that this equilibrium can sustain fair governance under conditions of interdependence only where robust professional norms, institutional integrity and shared role understandings are firmly in place. We then quantitatively examine the use of a practical grammar of this conception of interbranch impartiality in official reports from United Kingdom National Audit Office.