European Political Parties in the EU Agenda-Setting. The Case of Minimum Wages and the Party of European Socialists

Research on European political parties has traditionally highlighted their organisational weaknesses and limited institutional leverage, leading scholars to underestimate their capacity to shape EU public policy. Yet recent developments in EU social policy challenge this conventional view. This paper examines how the Party of European Socialists (PES) contributed to the inclusion of minimum wages in the European Union’s institutional and decision agendas, culminating in the European Commission’s 2020 proposal for a Directive on Adequate Minimum Wages. Through this case, the paper explores the broader question of how European political parties can influence agenda-setting in the EU. To address this question, the study conceptualises Europarties as transnational advocacy coalitions and draws on the Advocacy Coalition Framework combined with theories of policy entrepreneurship. It argues that the PES acted as a policy entrepreneur within the wider social-democratic political family, undertaking strategies aimed at framing the issue, coordinating actors, engaging with external stakeholders, managing internal dissent, and securing key institutional positions capable of exercising formal agenda-setting powers. The empirical analysis employs sequential process-tracing and relies on documentary sources and interviews with actors in the Commission, Parliament, PES, and trade unions. The findings show that PES influence unfolded over several stages. Initial debates on minimum wages in the 1990s never reached the EU agenda due to legal constraints, neoliberal dominance, and limited party engagement. The mid-2000s brought renewed attention due to enlargement-related concerns, but PES activism remained embryonic. A major shift occurred after 2014. The introduction of a statutory minimum wage in Germany, a core PES member state, signalled growing national support. The Juncker Commission’s political commitment to strengthening the social dimension of the EU created a favourable supranational context. Within this window of opportunity, PES built internal coordination venues—most notably the Social Europe Network—where national parties, experts, MEPs, and the Europarty leadership aligned frames and strategies. The PES also cultivated a strong alliance with the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and secured crucial institutional roles, including the Employment Commissioner portfolio and the Parliament’s rapporteurships, enabling the political family to channel ideas into concrete legislative action. Despite persistent opposition from the Nordic social-democratic parties—concerned about the protection of collective bargaining models—the PES managed to maintain a sufficiently cohesive majority. This internal resilience, coupled with strategic engagement with the European People’s Party (EPP) during the legislative process, allowed the political family to sustain momentum until the Commission introduced the proposal in 2020. The study concludes that European political parties, and the PES in particular, can wield significant influence over EU agenda-setting when acting as policy entrepreneurs capable of coordinating transnational coalitions, shaping policy frames, and securing control over key institutional positions. The case of minimum wages demonstrates that party politics is a stronger force in EU social policy than commonly assumed, and that Europarties can provide the external political pressure often needed for the Commission to act. In this way, the paper aims to integrating reflections on political parties in the theoretical debate on agenda-setting in the EU.