Defending Unity in a Time of Democratic Backsliding: The State as Counter-Secessionist Actor

This paper introduces the “state part” of a forthcoming monograph on counter-secession for OUP. The book conceptualises counter-secession as a configuration of governance in which political and economic forces suppress secessionist momentum and preserve existing borders. Within this framework, the state remains the primary defender of territorial integrity, deploying legal, coercive, economic, and symbolic tools at home and abroad. The paper focuses on how these tools are combined under conditions of democratic backsliding and rising majority nationalism. The central question driving the paper is: How do states respond to secessionist challenges? To answer it, the paper develops a typology of state strategies of counter-secession, distinguishing between violent and non-violent responses. On the violent side, states may resort to repression, civil war, emergency rule, and expansive counter-terrorism frameworks. On the non-violent side, they rely on constitutional engineering, federalism and autonomy arrangements, economic integration and redistribution, symbolic nation-building, and diplomatic campaigns to block recognition and maintain territorial integrity. The first part maps the domestic repertoire of state responses. It disaggregates peaceful strategies into various clusters. These tools can either open space for internal self-determination or harden majoritarian control over contested territories. The second part examines the external dimension of counter-secession. Governments seek to frame secession as a threat to international stability, mobilise diplomatic alliances, and influence the interpretation of international norms on self-determination and recognition. Through bilateral diplomacy, regional organisations, and international courts, they attempt to close off recognition pathways for secessionist entities while affirming their own claims to sovereignty and territorial integrity. Empirically, the paper draws on a set of democratic and hybrid regimes, including Spain/Catalonia, Canada/Quebec, the UK/Scotland, India/Kashmir, Indonesia/Aceh, Ethiopia/Tigray, and Serbia/Kosovo. These cases illustrate how similar counter-secessionist tools can be deployed in liberal, illiberal, and post-conflict settings, and how the same instrument (for example, constitutional entrenchment of territorial unity or security legislation) can either protect liberal democracy or contribute to its erosion. The conclusion links the analysis of state strategies to broader debates on democratic backsliding and militant democracy. It argues that the crucial question is not whether states resist secession (they almost always do) but how they do so and whether their responses remain compatible with norms of pluralism, minority protection, and the rule of law. In doing so, the paper aligns the study of secession and autonomy with current discussions on authoritarian retrenchment and democratic resilience.