Post-digital authoritarianism: From shutdowns and censorship to violations of user rights

States can employ a variety of tactics of digital authoritarianism, defined as “the use of digital technology by governments to oppress citizens and reduce their ability to openly criticize government decisions” (Yilmaz & Yang, 2023, p. 152). This research investigates longitudinal trends in digital authoritarian practices to identify tactics that are increasingly preferred by autocratic regimes. Tactics of digital authoritarianism are grouped into three dimensions based on who or what is targeted (Freedom House, 2023). These are (1) obstacles to access the internet itself, (2) limitations on content shared online and (3) violations of the rights of internet users. The study draws on a data set with yearly ratings for nations around the world along these dimensions, based on which they are classified as Free, Partly Free or Not Free (Freedom House, 2023). The analysis focuses on nations classified as Not Free at least once between 2011 and 2023. The data indicate sharp differences on a global scale in digital authoritarianism as practised along these dimensions. Nations classified as Not Free score poorly overall. However, their ratings have been stable or marginally improved in terms of obstacles to access the internet, such as shutdowns. The ratings for limits on content, such as blocking content that should be protected under international human rights standards, have stayed the same or declined occasionally. But the ratings for violations of users’ rights — such as restrictions on anonymous communication, institution of laws criminalizing online activities protected under international standards, extralegal intimidation by the state and so on — witness a steep fall in many nations. To illustrate, the sharpest declines in ratings for violations of user rights were witnessed in Ethiopia (from 18 to 10 between 2011 and 2023), Saudi Arabia (from 11 to 5 in 2011-23), Pakistan (from 14 to 8 in 2012-23), and Kazakhstan (from 16 to 10 in 2015-23). In contrast, their ratings for obstacles to internet access and limits on content remained roughly the same or even improved marginally. A comparative case study of these four nations reveals several similarities. Specifically, digital authoritarianism takes the form of vague “counterterrorism” laws; increasing state control over platforms, telcos, and their opertions through legal and extralegal means; purchase of surveillance technology from Israel, United States, China, and Russia; and ordinary citizens acting as vigilantes on behalf of the state, targeting regime opponents, dissidents living abroad, and journalists. Drawing on the analysis, we identify three modalities of an emergent “post-digital” authoritarian order. First, authoritarianism is increasingly transnational in scope — not only because of the rise of a transnational network of suppliers of surveillance technology but also because of the diffusion of authoritarianism as a norm and practice. Second, authoritarianism is increasingly neoliberal in orientation, with private technology companies playing a expansive role. Third, authoritarian is increasingly participatory in character, involving common citizens in Deleuzian societies of control. *The article is co-authored with Sagnik Dutta