Geographical Indications and the Politics of EU Trade: Regulatory Design, Contestation and Negotiation Outcomes

Geographical Indications (GIs) have become one of the most politically charged components of EU trade agreements. Formally technical intellectual property tools, they increasingly shape distributive politics, identity debates and perceptions of regulatory power. While GI provisions have domestically somewhat facilitated cooperation in some negotiations, externally they have contributed to politicisation, delay or breakdown, including in the CETA and EU–Australia cases. Existing research treats GIs either through legal analysis, agricultural economics or the lens of EU regulatory export, but rarely explains why similar GI demands generate divergent political effects across agreements. This paper develops a political-economy framework that conceptualises GIs as embedded contestation devices: instruments whose impact depends on their legal design, their distributive consequences for producer coalitions and the symbolic frames through which they are publicly debated. Drawing on ongoing work that constructs the first cross-agreement dataset of GI provisions in EU trade deals (2000–2024), the paper identifies patterns in GI “intensity” (scope, rigidity, coexistence rules and transition periods) and links them to variation in negotiation timelines and politicisation events. These quantitative patterns are complemented by qualitative evidence from four emblematic cases – EU–Mercosur, CETA, EU–Australia and EU–Japan – based on documentary analysis and interviews with EU officials, member-state representatives and producer groups. Early findings indicate that GIs generate conflict when (i) highly asymmetric concessions concentrate distributive losses, (ii) restrictive legal design increases veto points and (iii) public debates frame GIs as protectionism rather than sustainability or heritage. Conversely, broad coalitions and sustainability-oriented framing can stabilise negotiations. By explaining when and how GI provisions facilitate or obstruct trade agreements, the paper contributes to debates on the politicisation of trade, regulatory power and the governance of agri-food systems. It also offers practical insights for designing legitimate, sustainable trade frameworks.