Participation as Representation: Electoral Networks and Democratic Innovation Adoption in Local Governance

Democratic innovations at the local administrative level present a puzzle for theories of representative governance: why do elected officials adopt participatory processes that slow implementation, increase administrative demands, and engage only small fractions of their constituents, when direct service delivery offers clearer electoral benefits? This paper examines New York City's Participatory Budgeting program to understand how power structures within legislative bodies shape democratic innovation adoption and durability. Beginning in 2011–2012 with four City Council members voluntarily allocating discretionary capital funds to community-driven proposal and voting processes, PB expanded to 28 of 51 council districts by 2015–2016 and has stabilized at roughly 24 districts. To identify which representatives adopt participatory governance, this study compares the campaign finance profiles of council members who implemented PB with those who did not, using data from 2009 to 2019. Preliminary findings reveal that PB adopters consistently exhibit distinctive fundraising patterns characterized by higher shares of match-eligible small-dollar contributions, broader contributor bases, and lower average contribution sizes. Critically, these patterns predate PB adoption by several electoral cycles and remain robust after accounting for incumbency, party affiliation, and district socioeconomic characteristics. The temporal sequence of these findings suggests that PB resonates with representatives whose electoral support is rooted in diffuse neighborhood networks rather than concentrated donor blocs or formal interest groups. PB does not enhance democratic legitimacy through increased participation volume or demographic representativeness—both remain limited. Rather, these preliminary findings point toward PB operating as a form of representation itself: when constituents demand participation and voice rather than specific service outcomes, representatives respond by adopting participatory processes. This challenges conventional narratives that frame democratic innovations primarily as mechanisms for broadening inclusion or improving policy efficiency. The politics of adoption—not just institutional design or citizen demand—appears to determine which democratic innovations take root in local administrative contexts. Representatives with particular electoral support structures adopt PB not because participatory processes deliver better outcomes, but because the process itself aligns with how these representatives already relate to their constituents. This suggests that participatory governance functions as a relational strategy of legislative representation, responding to constituent preferences for engagement and voice. Understanding variation in democratic innovation adoption therefore requires attention to the electoral foundations of representative-constituent relationships, with implications for how we assess the democratizing potential of participatory governance across municipal contexts.