A Civility-Based Form of Rooted Cosmopolitanism

At its core, cosmopolitanism is the belief that all human beings, regardless of their social, political, cultural, or religious affiliations, are part of a single moral community. As such, it appears that cosmopolitanism is morally superior to—and practically antagonistic toward—nationalism and patriotism. However, three general challenges have been raised against this strong form of cosmopolitanism, which emerges from the Stoic-Kantian tradition. These challenges concern: (1) the endorsement of a set of abstract moral principles that predetermine a homogeneous world culture; (2) the neglect of local identifications in relation to the concrete features of human life and social relationships; and (3) the prevalence of a Western-centric standard of universal values, such as human rights, that dominates international society and supersedes political communities. “Rooted cosmopolitanism,” initiated by Kwame Anthony Appiah, by contrast, serves as a revised and moderate form of cosmopolitanism aimed at mediating between our local attachments and cosmopolitan commitments. Drawing on Appiah’s concept of rooted cosmopolitanism, together with Stephen Angle’s reading of Confucianism as a “rooted global philosophy,” I propose in this essay to consider the possibility and plausibility of reinterpreting Confucianism as what I call a “civility-based form of rooted cosmopolitanism”, or simply, “civility-rooted cosmopolitanism.” In general, my proposal seeks to establish an overlapping global moral consensus on civility—hence, global civility—while rejecting cultural homogeneity, respecting local autonomy, and upholding indispensable global responsibilities from a Confucian perspective. To make this case, I argue that there is room to draw the idea of cultural humility—in the sense of cultivating a shared attitude of respect and empathetic regard for different cultures—from Confucianism. More broadly, civility is akin to the pivotal concept of “ritual propriety” (li 禮) in Confucianism, playing a distinct role in shaping who we are and how we treat one another. Civility, or li, is embedded in lived ways of life and reflects the concrete features of human existence and social practices. The upshot is that, within the framework of normative Confucianism, the moral significance of li derives from Confucius’ concept of “humaneness” or “benevolence” (ren 仁), Mencius’ notion of the “authentic mind” (benxin 本心), and Wang Yangming’ idea of “innate knowledge” (liangzhi 良知). All of these, in turn, support the equal moral worth of all human beings. For the sake of focus, I concentrate in particular on the extension of liangzhi. The notion of liangzhi, understood as “the heart-mind that cannot bear to see others suffer” (buren zhi xin 不忍之心), echoes Andrew Linklater’s account of global civility as moral restraints against harming others and as respect for human dignity. Overall, despite cultural differences, I contend that Confucianism, understood as civility-rooted cosmopolitanism, can contribute to an overlapping global moral consensus on a set of basic human needs—health, food, shelter, and education—endorsed by Appiah, Linklater, and Martha Nussbaum, among others.