Sovereignty and Asymmetric Conditionality in EU Enlargement Policy

Relations between the European Union (EU) and candidate countries are embedded in a structurally asymmetric framework of conditionality, whose legal coherence and democratic legitimacy are increasingly contested. This asymmetry can be explained, first and foremost, by the different legal status of the parties involved: on the one hand, a sovereign state aspiring to membership; on the other, a Union composed of twenty-seven sovereign states which, through predominantly intergovernmental decision-making procedures, exercise discretionary power over the admission of new members. Within the framework of Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), candidate countries are required to anticipate extensive compliance with EU law (the acquis communautaire), accepting a form of sovereignty transfer as a precondition for progress in the accession process. This dynamic is particularly visible in ostensibly “technical” instruments such as visa liberalisation, which have led several third countries to implement far-reaching reforms in sensitive areas - including the rule of law, border management, and fundamental rights - well before acquiring membership status. At the same time, these instruments have historically served the EU’s strategic interests by extending its normative and political influence beyond its formal borders. The sustainability of this model is called into question when the government of a candidate country, the central interlocutor in the accession procedure, proves unwilling to cooperate with EU institutions or adopts explicitly Eurosceptic positions. The recent Georgian experience illustrates how the willingness to concede sovereignty cannot be taken for granted, even in the presence of strong pro- European aspirations within society at large. This divergence between popular expectations and imposed conditionality generates a legitimacy gap that directly affects the democratic credibility of the enlargement process. This paper critically examines the relationship between candidate countries’ sovereignty and the accession procedure, focusing on the legal basis that legitimises the EU’s reform demands at different stages of the process. In the absence of fully coherent legal parameters, enlargement risks becoming a predominantly geopolitical decision-making space in which criteria and assessments are reshaped in response to shifts in the international environment. The paper thus contributes to the broader debate on the democratic legitimacy of EU enlargement and, ultimately, on the political and legal nature of the European Union as an integration project.