Making economic security work: Challenges for the Council and the EU’s institutional balance

The geo-economic turn of the European Union creates value- and interest-based tensions within the EU. In terms of values, the traditional divide between liberal-leaning and more interventionist member states has evolved into a debate on the use of trade and investment policies for foreign and security purposes. In line with a scenario of ‘emergency politics’ (Kreuder-Sonnen & White, 2022), some member states warn about the dangers of economic coercion of the EU and demand forceful geo-economic responses. Other member states are careful not to jeopardize the EU’s soft power as a liberal economic player and committed multilateralist. In terms of economic interests, member states differ in their dependence on foreign suppliers and markets. They also differ in their ability to participate in and benefit from EU policies to build ‘technological sovereignty’ and more resilient supply chains. Meanwhile, the blurring of boundaries between trade and security has opened new arenas for institutional competition and entrepreneurship at the supranational level. The “geopolitical Commission” under von der Leyen has extended its reach into areas traditionally linked to foreign and security policy, while some member states have sought to tie the hands of the Commission and protect their prerogatives in this domain. This paper reviews how the institutional edifice of the European Union is changing in response to these developments. It starts from the premise that the expanding economic security agenda generates strong functional pressures for coordination across levels of EU governance. These pressures stem from the increasing conflicts in the trade-security nexus, as well as the need for close cooperation in implementing EU geo-economic policies. Tools such as the Anti-Coercion instrument, the Investment Screening Framework, or de-risking policies on critical raw materials have followed a pattern of ‘coordinative Europeanization’ (Ladi & Polverari, 2025) and opened a space in which Commission and member states need to work together. Research has shown how the Commission, particularly DG Trade, has adapted to the geoeconomic turn through new coordination formats among Commission directorates and stronger links with the EEAS. Yet, as economic security rises on the agenda, member states also claim a greater institutional stake. In this context, little is known about how coordination unfolds within the Council and across the Council-Commission interface. Coordination across different Council formations, as well as member state reactions to Commission-led coordination initiatives (e.g., the EU Economic Security Network, Experts Groups), remain poorly understood. Drawing on insights from the institutional and coordination literature (e.g., on silo-resilience, cross-departmental interaction, and dynamics of intergovernmental coordination), the paper analyses how the EU member states have reacted to the emerging coordination pressures in a geo-economic world. It reviews value- and interest-driven motivations to promote or resist attempts at better coordination, as well as the member states’ ability to defend their values and interests in the trade-security nexus. In doing so, the paper contributes to the debate on the dynamics of integration and fragmentation as well as the changing institutional balance in an increasingly geo-economic EU.